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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO TRAVEL:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES
A STATUTE REQUIRING WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO RESIDE IN
A STATE FOR ONE YEAR BEFORE RECEIVING FULL BENEFITS
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)
I. FACTS
In 1992, hoping to make a modest reduction in its vast welfare bud-
get, California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions
Code (section 11450.03).1 The statute was part of an experimental
project that amended one of California's most expensive programs, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).2 As amended, the AFDC
program limited residents of California who had resided in the state for
less than one year to the welfare benefits they would have received in the
state of their prior residence. 3 Additionally, the experimental project
consisted of a "work-incentive" program which decreased the amount
of benefits given to AFDC recipients but increased the amount of earned
income recipients could keep.4 In October of 1992, the Secretary of
1. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 493 (1999) (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. § 11450.03 (West
Supp. 1999)). The petitioners characterized the statute as one aspect of a larger "time-limited experi-
mental project" designed to reduce California's welfare budget. See Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Saenz
(No. 98-97) (explaining the legislative history of section 11450.03); see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d
1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing other portions of the experimental project).
2. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. AFDC was created by the Social Security Act of 1935. See
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 517 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (explaining the development of
AFDC), affd, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 557 (1995). AFDC benefits are financed
through a cooperative program between the states and federal government. See id AFDC costs
California $2.9 billion annually. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. Based on the information for the fiscal
year of 1996-1997, California had the sixth highest benefit level in the nation; however, that ranking
dropped to 18th when housing costs were factored in. See id. at 496-97 (citing the uncontested
findings of the district court in Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 981 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affid, 134 F.3d
1400 (9th Cir. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Saenz, 526 U.S. 493).
3. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492. Section 11450.03 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code
provided:
(a) Notwithstanding the maximum aid payments specified in paragraph (1) of sub-
division (a) of Section 11450, families that have resided in this state for less than
12 months shall be paid an amount calculated in accordance with paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 11450, not to exceed the maximum aid payment that
would have been received by that family from the state of prior residence.
(b) This section shall not become operative until the date of approval by the United
States Secretary of Health and Human Services necessary to implement the
provisions of this sections so as to ensure the continued compliance of the state plan
for the following:
(1) Title IV of the federal Social Security Act (Subchapter 4 (commencing with
Section 601) of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States Code).
(2) Title IX of the federal Social Security Act (Subchapter 19 (commencing with
section 1396) of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States Code).
4. See Beno, 30 F.3d at 1060-61 (explaining the "work-incentive" portion of the project).
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Health and Human Services issued waivers granting approval of the
residency requirement 5 and the work incentive program.6
On December 21, 1992, three California residents filed an action
challenging the constitutionality of section 11450.03.7 The district court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and issued a restraining
order enjoining its enforcement. 8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, 9 and the Supreme Court granted California's petition
for certiorari. 10 Subsequent to this,-however, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decided Beno v. Shalala.11 At issue in Beno was the
work-incentive portion of the experimental project.12 In order to allow
California to implement the work-incentive program, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services waived the "Maintenance of Effort" require-
ment of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c)(1).1 3 However, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit vacated the Secretary's waiver on the basis that the
administrative record did not indicate that the Secretary adequately con-
sidered why disabled AFDC recipients were included in the work-
incentive benefit reduction.1 4  Without this waiver, the residency
requirement of section 11450.03 could not be implemented. 15 Thus, the
Supreme Court could not reach the merits of the case because there was
no longer a justiciable controversy. 16
5. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. Reducing the incentive for families to migrate to California in
order to obtain higher aid payments was the objective of the residency requirement according to the
waiver request letter. See Green, 811 F. Supp. at 522 n. 14 (discussing the waiver request letter).
6. See Beno, 30 F.3d at 1062 (discussing the waiver for the work-incentive program). Petitioners
in Saenz characterized the waiver as also granting approval of additional portions of the project. See
Petitioner's Brief at 6, Saenz (No. 98-97). First, Petitioners asserted that the project increased the
allowable value of the resources and automobiles of AFDC recipient families. See id. Petitioners
further asserted that the project provided additional child-care funding for recipients and school
progress bonuses for parenting teens. See id.
7. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493-94. In the first challenge to section 11450.03, the plaintiffs alleged
that they had moved to California to escape abusive relationships. See Green, 811 F. Supp. at 517.
8. See id. at 523. The district court concluded that section 11450.03 penalized the right to travel
without a sufficient justification for the penalty. See id.
9. Green v. Anderson, 26 F.3d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 557 (1995).
10. Green v. Anderson, 513 U.S. 922, 922 (1994).
11. 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the "residency
requirement" and "work-incentive" portions of the experimental project).
13. See id. at 1061. The "Maintenance of Effort" statute provided that the Secretary would not
approve any state's medical assistance plan with AFDC benefits levels less than those in effect under
such a plan on May 1, 1988. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c)(1) (1994)). Since the California
experiment reduced benefit levels below this amount, the state needed a waiver to implement the
experiment. See id.
14. See id. at 1076.
15. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 495 (1999) (stating that California acknowledged that the
Act would not be implemented without the Secretary's waiver); see also Petitioner's Brief at 7, Saenz
(No. 98-97) (stating that a waiver of the maintenance effort requirement was necessary for the
implementation of the residency requirement).
16. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 495 (citing Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995)).
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The residency requirement remained inoperative until Congress
enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA).17 Under PRWORA, California no longer needed ap-
proval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to implement a
residency requirement, 18 and consequently, enforcement of section
11450.03 commenced on April 1, 1997.19 Respondents filed an action
in district court the same day. 20 The district court concluded that the
enactment of PRWORA did not affect its previous analysis and issued a
temporary restraining order.2 1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 23 and held that
the residency requirement of section 11450 was unconstitutional. 24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has never conclusively identified
the precise source of the right to travel. 25 Notwithstanding this lack of
consensus on its source, the freedom to travel interstate has long been
17. See id. PRWORA replaced the AFDC program with Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). See id. PRWORA provided:
A State operating a program funded under this part may apply to a family the rules
(including benefit amounts) of the program funded under this part of another State if the
family has moved to the State from the other State and has resided in the State for less
than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
18. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 495. The rationale underlying Congress' authorization of residency
requirements was to protect states with high benefits levels from becoming "welfare magnets." See
Petitioner's Brief at 7, Saenz (No. 98-97). The "welfare magnet" theory hypothesizes that welfare
recipients will migrate to states that provide high benefits to a degree that would threaten to drain the
resources of those states. Brief for Institute for Justice at 2-3, Saenz (No. 98-97).
19. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 495. The California Department of Social Services announced the
enforcement of the statute by issuing an "All County Letter." Id. According to the letter, families
would receive the lower benefit amount even if they had lived in California all their lives but had
resided in another state for a short period and then decided to move back to California. See id. at
495-96. The residency requirement would not, however, apply to families that have recently moved to
California from another country. See id at 496. The letter also explained that section 11450.03 would
be applied regardless of a family's motive for moving to California. See id.
20. See Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 980 (E.D. Cal. 1997), afTd, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir.
1998, affTd sub nom. Saenz, 526 U.S. 493.
21. See id. at 985. Respondents in Roe asserted that they moved to California to obtain better
employment. See id. at 980.
22. See Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Saenz, 526 U.S.
493.
23. See Anderson v. Roe, 524 U.S. 982, 982 (1998).
24. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511. After the case was argued before the Supreme Court, Rita L.
Saenz replaced Eloise Anderson as the director of the California Department of Social Services. See
id. at 498 n.10.
25. See Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986) (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgement) (assigning the right to travel to the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV)); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941)
(assigning the right to travel to the Commerce Clause); Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177-78 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (assigning the right to travel to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th
Amendment).
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recognized by the Court as a basic right under the Constitution. 26 To
understand the willingness of the Court to infer the right to travel from
the Constitution, it is helpful to examine the right as it was known to the
American colonists. 27
A. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IN ENGLAND
During the early colonization of the United States, the right to travel
was severely restricted for most of the people of England. 28 Apprentice-
ship laws and the existence of guilds often prevented people from
moving to an area to engage in a new trade or craft. 29 More important
than work related restrictions on mobility, however, were the restrictions
created by the English system of poor relief.30
In 1601, an English statute was imposed that required each individ-
ual parish to supply relief for the poor through taxes on the lands of the
poor person's parish. 31 If the people became poor while they were in
the parish of their birth, then that parish would be responsible for their
support. 32 Likewise, if they became impoverished after recently moving
to a new parish, they would be required to return to their old parish and
rely on its poor relief.33 However, if a person became poor after acquir-
ing a "settlement" in the new parish, the new parish would then be
responsible for the poor relief. 34 Thus, parish officials often did all they
could to prevent new people from settling in their parish for fear that the
new residents may become paupers.35 Furthermore, parish officials
often discouraged current residents from leaving because they feared
residents might return to them as paupers. 36
B. THE PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The restrictions created by the guilds, apprenticeship laws, and the
poor relief statute provided strong incentives for English settlers to
26. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (citing Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
27. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMANRHrrs iNTHECoNSTrrnmoN oF 1787, at 163-66
(1956) (discussing the right to travel as it was known in seventeenth century England).
28. See id at 163-64 (discussing the restrictions placed on the right to travel in England).
29. See id. Apprenticeship laws prevented a worker from engaging in a trade until the worker
had been apprenticed in that trade for seven years. See id. at 163. Furthermore, each trade was
operated under a legal monopoly of its own guild. See id. at 164. Thus, a worker could not move to a
new town for a new job even if that new job was almost identical to the worker's old job. See id
30. See id.
31. See id. at 165.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id
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escape to the open spaces of the American colonies. 37 In colonial
America, the freedom to travel between the colonies received little or no
mention in colony charters.38 Similarly, legislation enacted by the col-
onies rarely addressed it.39 Nonetheless, laborers moved freely among
the colonies as needed. 40 Thus, it is likely that colonists took the
freedom of movement between the colonies for granted. 41
However, the Framers did address the right to travel specifically in
the Articles of Confederation.4 2 Article IV, Section 2 of the Articles
provided that "people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other state." 43 In contrast, this clause was specifically left
out of the text of the Constitution. 44 Notwithstanding its absence, it has
never been suggested,45 nor would it be logical to suggest, that the
Framers intended to abolish the right to travel by leaving the "ingress
and regress" clause out of the text of the Constitution. 46 Thus, it is
likely that the right was necessarily intended to have its source some-
where in the Constitution. 47
C. EARLY RIGHT TO TRAVEL CASES
The first major right to travel case decided in 1867 by the Court was
Crandall v. Nevada.48 At issue in Crandall was a Nevada law that placed
a tax on anyone passing through Nevada as a railroad or stagecoach
passenger.49 Writing for the Court, Justice Miller rejected the idea that
the tax violated the Commerce Clause.50 Instead, he found that the tax
37. See id. at 166.
38. See hi at 177.
39. See id. at 178.
40. See id. at 181.
41. See id. at 177. In contrast to the colonial charters, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, by which
France ceded Nova Scotia, contained provisions specifically protecting the right to travel. See i. at
177-78 (discussing the Treaty of Utrecht). Thus, Chafee concluded that the absence of similar speci-
fic provisions from the charters of the colonies indicates that "no serious barriers were expected to
arise along the boundaries between English colonies." Id. at 178.
42. See idt at 184.
43. Id. at 184-85.
44. See iad at 185.
45. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) (stating that, while there have been dis-
putes within the Court as to the source of the right to travel, "[aIll have agreed that the right exists").
46. See CAE, supra note 27, at 185. Chafee points out that as the members of the Philadelphia
Convention were framing the Constitution, they took great care to ensure that states were not allowed
to pass tariff laws. See CHAFEF, supra note 27, at 185. Chafee thus concludes that the Convention
would not have wanted to allow states to pass immigration laws. See CHAFEE, supra note 27, at 185.
47. See CHAE, supra note 27, at 185.
48. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
49. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46 (1867).
50. See id. at 43. Justice Miller reasoned that since Congress had not passed laws that were in
conflict with the Nevada tax, the Commerce Clause was not implicated. See id. Chafee argues that
Justice Miller's reasoning at this point was unsound and contrary to a number of dormant Commerce
Clause cases. See CHAF.EE, supra note 25, at 188.
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violated the right of a citizen "to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any
business he may have with it."51 In order to exercise this right, Justice
Miller reasoned that citizens must be free to pass through states without
burdens such as the tax imposed by Nevada.52
Following Crandall, the Court conservatively began to define the
right to travel. 53 In 1941, the Court in Edwards v. California54 invalida-
ted a California statute that made it a crime to bring an indigent person
into the state of California. 55 Writing for the Court, Justice Byrnes held
that the statute violated the Commerce Clause.56 Justice Byrnes reasoned
that, since the transportation of people is commerce, 57 the intended and
sole function of the California statute was to burden interstate com-
merce.58 Furthermore, Justice Byrnes stated that while care for the poor
may have formerly been a matter of state or local concern, it was now a
concern for the nation as a whole.59
Justice Douglas concurred in the result in Edwards but disagreed
with the majority's reliance on the Commerce Clause. 60 Instead, Justice
Douglas argued that the right to travel interstate was "an incident of
51. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44.
52. See id. (stating that the "right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose
soil he must pass in the exercise of it"). Although the tax of only one dollar did not seriously effect this
right, Justice Miller reasoned that if states were allowed to implement such a tax, they could hypo-
thetically tax passengers $1000. See id. at 46 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)). Furthermore, Justice Miller reasoned if one state could implement such a tax, then all states
could, resulting in a serious burden on the transportation of passengers among the states. See id. Jus-
tice Clifford, joined by Chief Justice Chase, dissented from the majority's opinion. See id. at 49
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford argued that the tax was a burden on commerce among the
several states; therefore, it should have been held unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce
Clause. See id
53. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 281 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900)). In Williams, the Court, while recognizing a right to
travel protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution, upheld a
Georgia law that taxed persons hiring labor for work outside the state but did not tax agents hiring for
local work. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 281 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williams, 179 U.S.
at 274).
54. 314 U.S. 160(1941).
55. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 171 (1941). According to Justice Rehnquist, the
statute in Edwards was "specifically designed to, and would, deter indigent persons from entering the
State of California." Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 282 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards, 314
U.S. at 171).
56. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173.
57. See id. at 172 (stating that the transportation of people is commerce).
58. See id. at 174.
59. See id. at 174-75 (analogizing the theory underlying English poor laws to the theory under-
lying the California statute); see also CHAFEE, supra note 27, 164-66 (discussing the English poor laws).
Justice Byrnes wrote, "Recent years, and particularly the past decade, have been marked by a
growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing for assistance to the needy has
ceased to be local in character." Edwards, 314 U.S. at 175.
60. See id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the right to travel interstate occupied a
more protected position than the movement of products across state lines). Justice Black and Justice
Murphy joined in Justice Douglas's concurrence. See id. at 181.
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national citizenship protected by the privileges [or] immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference." 61 Thus, Justice
Douglas reasoned that the California statute directly contravened the
principle of national citizenship by diluting the rights of such citizenship
to a class of people.62
As Crandall and Edwards illustrate, the right to travel was originally
implicated when a citizen of one state wanted to physically enter or pass
through another state. 63 Throughout the second half of the twentieth
century, the right to travel gradually expanded to include facets other
than actual physical movement through a state. 64 A possible bridge
between the early right to travel cases and the later expansion of that
right may be found in the broad language defining the right to travel in
the 1966 case United States v. Guest.65
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Guest, stated: "The
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to
use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in
doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union." 66 Furthermore, Justice Stewart did not attempt to identify the
source of the right, but rather suggested that it was conceived from the
beginning to be necessary to a strong union.67
61. Id. at 178. Justice Douglas reasoned that, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
1868, the right to travel had already been established as an incident of national citizenship by Justice
Miller's opinion in Crandall. See id. (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867)). As such
a right, Justice Douglas reasoned that the right to travel was protected from state interference by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 179.
62. See id. at 181 (stating that it would contravene the conception of national unity if states were
allowed to burden indigent people's freedom of movement). Justice Jackson also wrote a concur-
rence in which he agreed with Justice Douglas that the right to travel was an incident of national
citizenship. See id. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring). However, Justice Jackson qualified his agree-
ment by stating that the right to travel was not unlimited. See id. (listing contagious diseases and
criminal activity as bases for restricting a person's right to travel). Nonetheless, Justice Jackson did
not find indigence to be a proper basis to limit one's rights as a national citizen. See id.
63. See id. at 173 (striking down a law prohibiting the transportation of indigents into California);
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 39 (1867) (striking down a law that taxed people who
wanted to "get out of' or "pass through" Nevada).
64. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 282-83 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the early right to travel cases involved direct barriers to migration while the more
recent right to travel cases focused on distribution of state benefits).
65. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
66. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
67. See id. Justice Stewart did not deem it necessary to analyze the source of the right to travel
suggested in previous cases since there had been a general consensus that the right exists. See id. at
759.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:427
D. STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS
In 1969, drawing on the broad language from Guest, the Court
expanded the right to travel in the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thomp-
son.68 At issue in Shapiro was the constitutionality of the one-year
waiting periods that Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsyl-
vania imposed on new residents before they could receive AFDC assis-
tance. 69 Early in its opinion, the Court, as in Guest, identified interstate
travel as a constitutional right but disclaimed any need to ground the
right in any specific provision of the Constitution. 70
The Court reasoned that the classification created by the one-year
waiting period could not be justified by the purpose of deterring the
immigration of indigents, as such a purpose would be constitutionally
impermissible.71 The Court then addressed a number of permissible fis-
cal purposes asserted by the states to justify the classification. 72 At the
onset of addressing these fiscal objectives, the Court stated that there
must be more than a rational relationship between permissible objectives
and the one-year waiting period. 73 Rather, the Court found that, because
the one-year waiting period penalized the constitutional right to travel, it
must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.74
Under such scrutiny, the Court held that the one-year waiting period was
not necessary to promote the asserted fiscal purposes; thus, the classifica-
tion created by the waiting period violated the Equal Protection Clause.75
68. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
69. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 622-26 (1969).
70. See id. at 630 ("We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to
a particular constitutional provision.").
71. See id at 631 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)). At least one scholar
has argued that the Court erred at this point in its opinion by failing to distinguish between the right to
travel and the right of interstate migration. See Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare
Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 893, 896 (1997). Thus, the
argument continues, while a person may have a right to travel throughout a country, that same person
does not necessarily have a right to establish permanent residence in that country. See id.
72. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633-34. The permissible purposes asserted to justify the classifica-
tion included: (1) facilitating the planning of the welfare budget, (2) minimizing the opportunity of
recipients to fraudulently receive payments from two states, (3) providing an objective residency test,
and (4) encouraging new residents to enter the workforce. See id.
73. See id. at 634.
74. See id. (stating that any classification that penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right must
be "necessary to promote a compelling government interest"). A challenge to a classification created
by a state's welfare statute would be subject to rational basis review when standing alone; however,
when the classification also infringes on a fundamental right, it must survive strict scrutiny. See
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affd on other grounds, 157 F.3d 179 (3d
Cir. 1998).
75. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. It has been argued that, because the Court cited Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963), after declaring the right to travel to be fundamental, it seemed the
next step in the Court's analysis should have been a substantive due process analysis. See Zubler,
434
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In Dunn v. Blumstein,76 the Court relied on Shapiro to invalidate a
Tennessee statute that imposed a one-year durational residency require-
ment as a prerequisite to voting in state elections. 77 The Court first
concluded since the statute granted the right to vote to some and denied
it to others, the classification must be necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. 78 Additionally, the Court rejected the idea that Shapiro was
limited to cases of actual deterrence of migration and, therefore, found
that the statute directly impinged on the fundamental right to travel. 79
Under such scrutiny, the Court concluded that the reasons advanced by
Tennessee could not justify the classification. 80 However, the court
cautioned that Shapiro was not intended to invalidate appropriately
defined and uniformly applied bona fide residency requirements. 81
In 1974, the Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County82
relied on Shapiro to invalidate an Arizona statute requiring a one-year
residence in a county as a condition to receiving non-emergency medi-
cal care at county expense.83 In attempting to clarify Shapiro, the Court
stated that in Shapiro the right to travel was only involved in a limited
sense; what was actually at issue in Shapiro was the right to migrate. 84
Furthermore, the Court stated that the unconstitutional one-year waiting
period in Shapiro was distinct from appropriate residency requirements,
which remained valid. 85
supra note 71, at 897. Zubler hypothesizes that the Court chose to cite Sherbert for its equal protection
analysis because the court feared it would not be able to limit the scope of the right under due process
analysis. See Zubler, supra note 71, at 897. However, Zubler argues that the same over-broad
problem occurred under equal protection analysis. See Zubler, supra note 71, at 900. In his dissent,
Justice Harlan expressed similar fears as he stated that the fundamental rights strand of equal
protection "creates an exception which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule."
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661.
76. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
77. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 332 (1972).
78. See i& at 337.
79. See id. at 338. The Court rejected Tennessee's attempt to distinguish the classification on the
basis that there was no evidence of the durational residency requirement actually deterring travel.
See id. at 339. The Court stated:
This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law .... Shapiro did not rest
upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel .... [Tihe compelling-
state-interest test would be triggered by "any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right [to travel] .... "
Id. at 339-40 (citing and quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634).
80. See id. at 360. The first purpose rejected by the Court was that the durational residency pre-
vented fraud in voting. See id. at 353. The Court reasoned that the durational residency requirement
was not the least restrictive means of preventing fraud. See id. The court also rejected Tennessee's
second purpose, which was to ensure that voters were knowledgeable, on the basis that the relation-
ship between the state's interest in an informed electorate and the durational residency requirement
was too tenuous. See id. at 360.
81. See id at 342 n.13.
82. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
83. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 627).
84. See id& at 254-55.
85. See id. at 255 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.13 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
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Having clarified its Shapiro analysis, the Court next considered the
initial question of whether the statute penalized people who recently
migrated to Arizona. 86 To answer this question, the Court listed two
factors to consider in determining whether a durational residency
requirement impacted interstate travel to the extent necessary to invoke
the compelling interest test.87 The first of these factors was whether the
waiting period would deter migration. 88 The second consideration was
the extent to which the residency requirement served to penalize the
exercise of the right to travel.89
In addressing the first consideration, the Court in Maricopa County
concluded that indigent people could be deterred from migrating to
Arizona if they knew they could not rely on the state for medical care.90
Furthermore, the Court stated that even though there was no evidence of
anyone actually being deterred from migrating, the compelling interest
test was nonetheless appropriate due to the extent that the statute penal-
ized the exercise of the right to travel. 91 To reach this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that medical care, like the welfare benefits at issue in
Shapiro, was a necessity of life; therefore, the denial of medical care
penalized interstate travel to the same extent as the denial of welfare
benefits. 92
After concluding that the Arizona statute penalized the right to
travel, the Court continued to the second prong of its analysis by asking
whether the classification was supported by a compelling state interest.93
The Court rejected Arizona's fiscal interest in conserving its resources
by stating that "[t]he conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not
a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement
394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969)).
86. See id. at 256.
87. See id. at 257.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 258.
92. See id. at 259-60. The Court stated in a footnote that the lower court decisions that have
contrasted in-state college tuition with necessities of life indicate that medical care is a necessity of
life. See id. at 260 n.15. "Thus, the residence requirement in Shapiro could cause great suffering and
loss of life[;] [t]he durational residence requirement for attendance at publicly finance institutions of
higher learning (does) not involve similar risks." Id. (citing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238
(Minn. 1970), affid, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (quoting Kirk v. Board of Regents, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970))); see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 906 (13th ed. 1997) ("The critical ingredient for triggering strict scrutiny and
probable invalidation proved to be the existence of a 'penalty'; and whether there was a 'penalty'
apparently turned largely on whether there was an effect on a 'necessity of life'!"). The Court
rejected the state's attempt to distinguish Shapiro on the grounds that, unlike the complete denial of
welfare benefits at issue in Shapiro, the Arizona residency requirement did not apply to emergency
medical care. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 260-61 (1974). The Court
reasoned that allowing an illness to go untreated until it required emergency medical care would
subject indigents to serious illness and place them in great danger. See id. at 261.
93. See id. at 262.
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which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely migrate
and settle in another State." 94 The Court rejected the State's second
justification by stating the deterrence of migration was either constitution-
ally impermissible or over-inclusive. 95 The third argument rejected by
the Court was that the state should be able to protect its longtime resi-
dents based on their past tax payments. 96 In rejecting this argument, the
Court stated that such reasoning would logically permit the state to
violate the Equal Protection Clause by apportioning all services based on
past contributions. 97 The final justification the state asserted was that the
durational residency requirement aided in the prevention of fraud.9
8
The Court rejected this argument on the basis that there were less
constitutionally intrusive means available. 99
The trilogy of Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County illustrated the
expansion of the right to travel to include not only travel in the strict
sense of the word, but also the right to migrate. 100 In these decisions the
Court clearly required statutes that penalized this newly expanded right
to survive strict scrutiny. 101 Decisions subsequent to Maricopa County,
however, seemed to suggest that the Court was drifting away from its
strict scrutiny analysis of right to travel infringements.102
E. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS UNDER RATIONAL BASIS
REVIEW
In decisions subsequent to Maricopa County, the Court seemed to
move away from a strict scrutiny analysis of durational residency
requirements towards a form of rational basis review, as it struck down a
number of residency requirements on the basis that they were not
reasonably related to legitimate government purposes. 10 3  In such
94. Id at 263.
95. See id at 263-64. The Court stated that the statute was over-inclusive in that it treated all
indigents as if they moved to Arizona solely to obtain free medical care. See id. at 264.
96. See id. at 266.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 268.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 255 (stating that in Shapiro the Court was concerned primarily with the right to
migrate, while the right to travel was only involved in a limited sense).
101. See id. at 258 (stating that classifications which penalize the right to travel must be neces-
sary to a compelling state interest).
102. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 1998) (pointing out that a majority
of the Court has never applied strict scrutiny to a durational residency requirement since Maricopa
County).
103. See Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 186 (discussing the Court's use of rational basis review to strike
down residency requirements). The Court first appeared to move away from a strict scrutiny analysis
in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 326 (E.D. Pa.
1998), aff'd on other grounds, 157 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing Sosna). In Sosna, the Court
upheld a one-year residency for petitioners seeking a divorce. See 419 U.S. at 410. The Court in
Sosna first distinguished Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County on the basis that the state's interests in
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decisions, however, the court found it unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny
because the durational residency requirements at issue could not even
pass rational basis.104 Therefore, Shapiro and Maricopa County
remained binding precedents.lOS
Nonetheless, in the 1986 plurality opinion of Attorney General v.
Soto-Lopez, 10 6 there was marked disagreement among the Justices
regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny of an alleged right to travel
infringement. 0 7 At issue in Soto-Lopez was a New York statute that
granted a civil service employment preference for veterans who had lived
in New York when they entered the service.108 Justice Brennan, writing
for the plurality, struck down the statute on the basis that it penalized the
right to travel. 109 Justice Burger and Justice White, in a concurrence,
found the statute failed the equal protection rational basis test.110 Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, found the statute's
effect on migration too insignificant to invoke the Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause; therefore, they would have upheld the statute as
passing the equal protection rational basis test.lll
Thus, as Soto-Lopez illustrated, there was much disagreement
among the Justices regarding the scope and source of the right to
regulating its domestic relations and protecting its divorce decrees from collateral attack was
materially greater than the administrative and budgetary interests advance in prior cases. See id. at
406-09. Second, the court in Sosna found that the one-year residency requirement did not prevent
persons from eventually obtaining a divorce decree. See id. at 410.
The Court's shift away from strict scrutiny continued in the case of Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982). See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D at 326 (discussing Zobel). In Zobel, the court relied on rational
basis review to invalidate an Alaska statute that based the size of oil reserve payments on the years of
residency. See 457 U.S. 55. However, Chief Justice Burger, in writing for the Zobel Court, appears to
have actually applied an enhanced rational basis review. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 326-27 (citing
Zubler, supra note 71, at 905). Justice O'Connor, in a concurrence in Zobel, first articulated her
argument that the right to travel should be based in Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. See
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under this clause, the constitutionality of a
durational residency requirement depended on whether non-citizens "constitute a peculiar source of
evil at which the statute is aimed." Id. at 76. If the non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of evil,
then there must be a "substantial relationship" between the residency requirement and the source of
the evil. Id
In Hooper v. Benalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985), the Court applied Zobel's enhanced
rational basis review to invalidate a New York statute that granted a tax exemption to Vietnam
Veterans residing in the state prior to May 8, 1976. The Court, in Hooper, cited Zobel for the proposi-
tion that residents cannot be discriminated against solely on the basis of their date of arrival in the
state. See Hooper, 472 U.S. at 622.
104. See Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 186 (discussing the Court's use of rational basis review to strike
down durational residency requirements).
105. Id
106. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
107. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 327 (discussing Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)).
108. See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 899.
109. See id. at 911.
110. See id. at 915 (Burger, J., concurring in the judgment), id. at 916 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
111. See id. at 918-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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travel.11 2 The rational basis decisions had left the Supreme Court's right
to travel jurisprudence in a state of confusion.ll 3 In Saenz v. Roe 114 the
Court would have an opportunity to resolve some of this confusion.15
III. ANALYSIS
In Saenz, the Court held that it was a violation of the right to travel
for California to require new residents to reside in the state for one year
before receiving full in-state welfare benefits. !16 However, before reach-
ing this conclusion, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, attempted to
resolve the confusion surrounding the right to travel by dividing that
right into three components."i7
A. THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Justice Stevens identified the first component of the right to travel as
"the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another
State." 118 The Court found that this component was not implicated in
Saenz, because the durational residency requirement at issue did not
pose a direct barrier to interstate movement.1 19 Similarly, the Court
found that the second component, the right of a citizen of one state to be
treated as a welcome visitor when passing through another state, was also
not at issue. 120 The Court reasoned that the interstate travelers in Saenz
were not merely visiting, but instead had established residence in
California.1 21 The component of the right to travel that the Court did
find to be at issue was the third component-"the right of newly arrived
citizens to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens
of the same State." 122
The Court identified the source of the third component of the right
to travel as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 123 In doing so, Justice Stevens wrote, "it has always been common
ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to
112. See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 327.
113. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the law regarding
the right to travel is unsettled and in need of clarification).
114. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
115. See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
116. See id. at 511.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 501.
120. See id. at 502.
121. See id Although it was not implicated in Saenz, the Court identified the source of the second
component as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. See Saenz, 526
U.S. at 501.
122. Id. at 502.
123. See id. at 502-03.
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travel." 124 Having identified the constitutional source of the third com-
ponent of the right to travel, the Court concluded that a statute which
infringes on that right must be strictly scrutinized. 125
B. THE ONE-YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
The Court rejected California's argument that its welfare scheme
only incidentally affected the right to travel. 126 The Court reasoned that
the discriminatory classification created by the statute is in itself a
penalty to the right to travel, even if migration is not actually deterred. 127
The Court then dismissed any attempt to label the statute as a bona fide
residency requirement. 128 In doing so, the Court first reasoned that the
state citizenship of the welfare recipients in this case was not disputed. 129
Furthermore, the Court concluded that, unlike bona fide residency
requirements that governed the distribution of portable benefits, the
residency requirement at issue in Saenz governed the distribution of
welfare benefits that would be consumed within the state in which it was
received. 130
Having established the right being infringed upon and the appropri-
ate level of scrutiny, the Court then defined the various classifications
created by the statute. 131 The group favored by the classification includ-
ed California citizens who had resided in the state for one year and new
residents who had resided in a state with welfare benefits as high, or
higher, than California's welfare benefits. 132 The disfavored class in-
cluded those residents who had moved to California from a state with
lower welfare benefits and had resided in California for less than one
124. Id. at 503 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)). Justice Stevens
pointed out that even Justice Miller, writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, stated that
one of the privileges conferred by this clause "is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own
volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same
rights as other citizens of that State." Id. (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80).
Justice Stevens then cited the stronger language of Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases in which Justice Bradley wrote:
The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any
classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go
to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of
rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain
him in that right. He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act of
grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.
See id. at 503-04 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 112-13).
125. See id. at 504.
126. See id.
127. See id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339 (1972)).
128. See id. at 505.
129. See id.
130. See id. (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)).
131. See id.
132. See id.
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year.133 However, making up this disfavored class were various subclass-
es determined by the welfare laws of each new arrival's respective state
of prior residency.134 Therefore, the Court stated that California must
"explain not only why it is sound fiscal policy to discriminate against
those who have been citizens for less than a year, but also why it is
permissible to apply such a variety of rules within that class."135
The Court prefaced its analysis of California's main argument by
reiterating that residency requirements cannot have as their purpose the
deterrence of immigration by welfare recipients from other states. 136
The Court first reasoned that the empirical evidence did not indicate that
higher benefits motivated people to move, and the legislative history
presented by California did not suggest that the statute was enacted for
such a purpose.137 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that even if the
statute's purpose was to prevent an influx of welfare recipients, such a
purpose would be constitutionally impermissible.138
The Court then turned to California's primary justification for the
durational residency requirement. 139 California attempted to justify the
statute on the basis that it saved the state approximately $10.9 million a
year.140 The Court rejected this argument based on the reasoning that
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not allow
for[ ] degrees of citizenship based on length of residence."141 There-
fore, the Citizenship Clause did not tolerate the forty-five subclasses
created by California's durational residency requirement.142 The Court
reasoned that "[n]either the duration of respondents' California resi-
dence, nor the identity of their prior States of residence, has any rele-
vance to their need for benefits." 143 As in Shapiro, the Court concluded
that to accept the reasoning proffered by California "would permit the
State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax
contributions of its citizens."144
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 506.
137. See id.
138. See id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,69 (1982)).
142. See id. at 506-07.
143. Id. at 507.
144. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969)).
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C. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Having determined that, standing alone, California's durational
residency requirement was unconstitutional, the Court then considered
whether congressional approval of the requirement affected its deter-
mination. 145 The Court concluded that Congress' approval of the resi-
dency requirement in no way affected its holding. 146 The Court rea-
soned, "[W]e have consistently held that Congress may not authorize the
States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment." 147 Furthermore, the Court
stated that "the protection afforded to the citizen by the Citizenship
Clause of that Amendment is a limitation on the powers of the National
Government as well as the States." 148
The Court rejected the United States' argument that without dura-
tional residency requirements in place, there would be a "race to the
bottom" under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)49
145. See id. at 507.
146. See id.
147. l
148. Id. at 507-08. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that "although it has long been deemed
axiomatic that 'Congress may not authorize States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,' it does not
necessarily follow that Congress may not utilize a state as a kind of federal agent empowering
(although not commanding) it to carry out a federal function pursuant to a congressional enactment
that itself violates nothing in the Constitution." Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present, 113
HARv. L. REV. 110, 128 (1999). Thus, Professor Tribe concludes that it was important for the Court to
explicitly state that the protectionafforded by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
limit on the national government as well as the states. See id.
149. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 495 (stating that under PRWORA, TANF replaced the AFDC
program). The "race to the bottom" theory starts with the proposition that under TANF, states are
given broader discretion in setting their benefit levels than they had under AFDC. Brief for the United
States at 13-14, Saenz (No. 98-97). Therefore, if states are not allowed to employ durational resi-
dency requirements, each state would attempt to offer a less attractive benefit plan than the other
states in order to avoid becoming a welfare magnet. See id. at 16. The Court did not find sufficient
evidence to support this argument and rejected it on the basis that "speculation about such an unlikely
eventuality provides no basis for upholding section 11450.03." Saenz, 526 U.S. at 510.
Some researchers, however, have asserted that a race to the bottom could likely occur if states
are prohibited from having durational residency requirements such as section 11450.03. See Zubler,
supra note 71, at 933 & n.192 (stating that durational residency requirements "might mitigate the race
to the bottom"). In collecting empirical evidence to determine if such a race to the bottom could
occur, researchers have developed a two-step analysis. See Zubler, supra note 71, at 933. First, they
look for evidence of whether higher benefit levels in a particular state will motivate indigent persons
to move to that state. See Zubler, supra note 71, at 933. Second, researchers look for evidence of
states lowering their benefit levels in response to an influx of indigent persons. See Zubler, supra note
71, at 933.
Regarding the first of these two inquiries, four studies have shown "positive and significant
effects of welfare on residential location and geographic mobility." See Zubler, supra note 71, at 933
(quoting Robert Moffit, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30. J. EcON. LrrEA-
TuE 1. 34 (1992)). Furthermore, one study predicts that a state with high benefit levels will increase a
state's poverty rate by 0.9% compared to a state with lower benefits. See Zubler, supra note 71, at
933 (citing PAuL E. PETERSON & M ARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A C ASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD
79 (1990)). Lastly, according to a Wisconsin study, 29% of welfare recipients who recently migrated
to Wisconsin from Chicago listed Wisconsin's higher welfare benefits as the reason for the move. See
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program as states would try to prevent an influx of welfare recipients by
decreasing their respective benefit levels. 150 The Court reasoned that
there would be no greater incentive to decrease benefits under the TANF
program than there was under AFDC.151 Similarly, the Court rejected
the argument that there would be a greater incentive for welfare recipi-
ents to change their residency under the TANF program than there was
under the AFDC program.' 5 2 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a
policy of eliminating incentives for welfare recipients to move to Cali-
fornia was just as constitutionally impermissible as actually preventing
welfare recipients from moving to California. 153 The Court then briefly
rejected the Solicitor General's attempt to classify the durational residen-
cy requirement as "a sort of specialized choice-of-law rule" by reason-
ing that "California law alone discriminates among its own citizens on
the basis of their prior residence." 154
The final argument rejected by the Court was that the classification
would be permissible if the members of the disfavored class were limited
to people who had received welfare in their prior state of residency
within one year of moving to California. 155 The Court reasoned that to
construct the statute in such a manner would cause the neediest members
of the disfavored class to suffer the most and would reduce the state's
monetary savings, thereby making the monetary justification asserted by
California less tenable. 156 Furthermore, "it would confine the effect of
the statute to what the Solicitor General correctly characterizes as 'the
invidious purpose of discouraging poor people generally from settling
in the State."' 157
Zubler, supra note 71, at 934 (citing Rogers Worthington, Study Finds Evidence Some View Wisconsin
as a Welfare Magnet, CHiT. Tiun., May 23, 1995, at 4).
Regarding the second inquiry, one study has indicated that state legislatures will react to indigent
migration by cutting welfare benefits in order to make their respective states less attractive to the poor.
See Zubler, supra note 71, at 934 (citing PETERSON & ROM, supra, at 79). Furthermore, even if the poor
are not motivated to move to a state because of higher welfare benefits, the study hypothesized that
legislatures act on this presumption anyway. See Zubler, supra note 71, at 934. Therefore, it has even
been suggested that states may engage in a race to the bottom despite an absence of empirical
evidence indicating that the poor migrate toward states with higher welfare benefits. See Zubler,
supra note 71, at 934-35.
150. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 509-10 (1999).
151. See id. at 510.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id
157. Id (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 30 n.j 1, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (No. 98-97)).
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D. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DissNr
Chief Justice Rehnquist prefaced his dissent by criticizing the
Court's reliance upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause.158 Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the Court's identification of the first two compo-
nents of the right to travel, but he did not agree that "the right to be-
come a citizen of another State is a necessary 'component' of the right
to travel." 159 Rather, he argued that "[t]he right to travel and the right
to become a citizen are distinct, their relationship is not reciprocal, and
one is not a 'component' of the other."1 60
Justice Rehnquist further asserted that infringements on the right to
travel are limited to actual barriers on interstate migration, such as that in
Edwards v. California.161 However, he argued that the development of
the Court's penalty analysis in Shapiro and its progeny has caused the
right to travel to become confused with the right to equal state
citizenship.162 As a result, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court
has strayed far from the original meaning of the right to travel. 163
By grounding the third component of the right to travel-the right
to become a citizen-in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the Court actually abandoned the penalty analy-
sis and "essentially returned to its original understanding of the right to
travel." 164 However, in "unearthing from its tomb" the right of a state
citizen to be treated equally in a new state of residence, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Court ignored the states' needs for bona fide residency
requirements. 165 Justice Rehnquist saw no distinction between the bona
158. See id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court today breathes new life into the pre-
viously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-a Clause relied upon
by this Court in only one other decision, Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled five years
later by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).").
159. Id. at 513.
160. Id.
161. See id at 514 n.l (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)). Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the Slaughter-House Cases confirmed his view that state infringement on the right to travel is
limited to actual barriers, as established in Edwards. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 514. In Edwards, the
Court held that a California statute which prohibited the transportation of indigents into California was
unconstitutional. See 314 U.S. at 177.
162. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 514 (1999) (citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250,280- 83 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969)).
163. See id. at 515 (arguing that laws distinguishing between old and new residents implicate the
right of individuals to be free from unjustifiable classification rather than the right to travel).
164. Id. at 516.
165. See id. at 516.
A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied,
furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents
are enjoyed only by residents.... A bona fide residence requirement simply requires
that the person does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted
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fide residency requirements to receive in-state college tuition and a one-
year residency requirement to receive full welfare benefits. 166 Therefore,
he criticized the majority's attempt to distinguish between these two bene-
fits based on their portability as being "more apparent than real, and
offer[ing] little guidance to lower courts who must apply this rationale in
the future." 167
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist argued that states have a greater
need for a durational residency requirement to determine eligibility for
welfare benefits than they do to determine eligibility for in-state tui-
tion. 168 Justice Rehnquist hypothesized that a large number of new resi-
dents seeking welfare benefits would have a far greater impact on a
State's budget than a large number of new residents seeking to attend a
state university.1 69 Thus, Justice Rehnquist would have upheld the one-
year residency requirement as "a permissible exercise of the State's
power to 'assur[e] that services provided for its residents are enjoyed
only by residents."'l 7 0
E. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT
Justice Thomas joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent, but he also wrote
separately to thoroughly address the majority's reliance on the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 171 Justice Thomas first traced the origins of the
phrase "privileges or immunities" to similar phrases found in the
charters of the American colonies. 172 In doing so, he concluded that "at
to residents.
Id. at 517 (quoting Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328-29,(1983)). Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted
that even under Shapiro and its progeny, the Court took care to distinguish bona fide residency
requirements from residency requirements that penalized new residents. See id. (citing Attorney
General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 n.3 (1986)).
Professor Tribe criticizes Justice Rehnquist's argument on this point. See Tribe, supra note 147,
at 131-32. Professor Tribe argues that if California were truly concerned about a welfare recipient's
bona fide status as a new resident, it would withhold benefits altogether rather than providing recipi-
ents the benefit levels of their old state of residency. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 131. Professor
Tribe also points to the fact that the statute applies to those individuals who were not even on welfare
before they moved to California. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 131. Similarly, Professor Tribe argues
that California already had means to determine the bona fide residency of a recipient without the use
of the residency requirement. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 131. Finally, Tribe asserts that Chief
Justice Rehnquist's argument was "merely hypothetical and speculative justification" since neither
California nor the United States advanced the bona fide residency argument. Tribe, supra note 147, at
132.
166. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 518 (1999).
167. Id. at 519. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that, while the cash received from welfare bene-
fits will be consumed in California, the benefits that result from that income, such as occupational
training and job experience, are easily transportable to the resident's old domicile. See id. at 519-20.
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist asserted that "tuition subsidies are 'consumed' in-state but the recipient
takes the benefits of a college education with him wherever he goes." Id. at 520
168. See id. at 519.
169. See id
170. Id. (quoting Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328).
171. See id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 523 n.2 (citing a number of colonial charters with provisions similar to the Privi
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the time of the founding, the terms 'privileges' and 'immunities' (and
their counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights
and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens, and more broadly,
by all persons."173
Having established the historical underpinnings of the terms "privi-
leges" and "immunities," Justice Thomas then turned to Justice
Bushrod Washington's interpretation of Article IV's Privileges and Im-
munities Clause in the 1825 landmark opinion of Corfield v. Coryell.174
Justice Thomas stated that in Corfield, Justice Washington "rejected the
proposition that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed equal
access to all public benefits." 175 Instead, Justice Thomas argued that
Justice Washington "endorsed the colonial-era conception of the terms
'privileges' and 'immunities,' concluding that Article IV encompassed
only fundamental rights that belong to all citizens of the United
States."176
Justice Thomas then tied the Corfield opinion to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by citing the numer-
ous references to Corfield found in the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 177 Thus, Justice Thomas reasoned that the repeated
references to Corfield, combined with the historical underpinnings of
the Clause's operative terms, "supports the inference that, at the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, people understood that 'privi-
leges or immunities of citizens' were fundamental rights, rather than
every public benefit established by positive law."178 Therefore, Justice
Thomas concluded that it was contrary to the original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause for the majority to hold that a state
violates the clause by imposing a one-year residency requirement as a
prerequisite to receiving full welfare benefits.179
leges or Immunities Clause). Specifically, Justice Thomas traced the Clause to the 1606 Charter of
Virginia, which provided that "all and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall dwell and
inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies .. .shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties,
Franchises, and Immunities ...as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realme of
England." Id.
173. Id. at 524.
174. See id. (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
175. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 525 (1999) (citing Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552).
176. See id. at 526.
177. See id. (citing John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1418 (1992); Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1866)).
178. See id. at 527.
179. See id. Justice Thomas stated that he would be open to reevaluating the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. See id. at 528. However, he suggested that the Clause should be used to "displace"
rather than "augment" the Court's substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence. See id
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IV. IMPACT
In Saenz, the Court relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment for only the second time in the 130 years
since its enactment. 180 Whether this could signify a resurgence of that
clause is yet to be seen. 181 However, the more immediate effect of Saenz
is likely to be the effect of the decision on the state welfare systems.' 8 2
A. EFFECT ON STATE WELFARE SYSTEMS AND BONA FIDE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS
In addition to California, thirteen other states had durational resi-
dency requirements similar to that struck down in Saenz.183 It is likely
that the residency requirements in these states would also be unconsti-
tutional. 184 Unlike the California statute at issue in Saenz, North Dakota
Century Code section 50-09-29(1)(1) does not limit new residents to the
benefit levels of their previous states of residency.18 5 Instead, section
50-09-29(1)(1) incorporated the durational limits for receiving such
benefits of the new residents' previous states of residency.' 8 6 Nonethe-
less, because section 59-09-01(1)(1) creates a classification between old
and new residents, the Attorney General concluded that it would be
unconstitutional after Saenz.187
It is also not clear what bona fide residency requirements will be
constitutional after Saenz, since Respondents' California citizenship was
not being disputed.188 Thus, the Court did not need to address the
constitutionality of bona fide residency requirements under the third
component of the right to travel as now grounded in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 8 9 However, the
180. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181. See generally Tribe, supra note 147, 182-98 (discussing the possibility that Saenz indicates a
rebirth of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
182. See 1999 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10 (July 23, 1999), available at 1999 WL 600316, at *2
(stating that section 50-09-29(1)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code and section 75-02-01.2-35.1 of
the North Dakota Administrative Code are likely unconstitutional after the Court's decision in Saenz).
183. See Brief for the National Governors' Association at 12 & n.4, Saenz (No. 98-97) (listing
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York. North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin as states with residency requirements
for welfare benefits).
184. See 1999 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10, available at 1999 WL 600316, at *2 (stating that
section 50-09-29(1)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code and section 75-02-01.2-35.1 of the North
Dakota Administrative Code are likely unconstitutional after the Court's decision in Saenz).
185. See id. at *3 (distinguishing the North Dakota statute from the California statute at issue in
Saenz).
186. See id
187. See id
188. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).
189. See id.
4472000]
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Court, in passing, distinguished previous valid bona fide residency re-
quirements by stating: "whatever benefits they receive will be consumed
while they remain in California, there is no danger that recognition of
their claim will encourage citizens of other States to establish residency
for just long enough to acquire some readily portable benefit, such as a
divorce or a college education, that will be enjoyed after they return to
their original domicile." 190 In his dissent in Saenz, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist asserted that by affirming the right to be treated equally in a new
state of residence immediately, the Court ignored the states' need to have
bona fide residency requirements. 191 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist pre-
dicts that the Court's attempt to distinguish a valid from an invalid resi-
dency requirement based on the portability of the effected benefit is a
confusing and vague standard for lower courts to apply.
B. THE POSSIBLE REBIRTH OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMmuNrrIEs
CLAUSE
In Saenz, the Court identified the source of the third component of
the right to travel as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 192 In so doing, the Court unearthed a clause
that was once thought by many to be dead. 193 In recent times, a number
of scholars have called for the revival of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 194 Whether Saenz is the first step in that direction is yet to be
seen. 195
If such an event were to take place, it is not clear what role the
clause would play in the creation of substantive rights.196 One possible
role the clause could play is in the challenging of comprehensive eco-
nomic regulation.197 A second role of the clause would be to overlap the
protection of a similar set of rights protected by the Due Process
Clause. 198 Finally, as argued by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Saenz,
the clause could be used to displace portions of the Court's current
substantive due process jurisprudence. 199
190. Id.
191. See id. at 518 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
192. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-03.
193. See id at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 182.
195. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 197.
196. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 183 n.327 (citing Harrison, supra note 177, at 1387-88).
197. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 189 n.341.
198. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 193 n.353.
199. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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However, whatever its proper role, it is not likely that Saenz will be
the first step in the revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 200
Instead, Saenz may be more properly seen as an illustration of the
Court's current willingness to protect human rights that may be de-
scribed as necessary to the structure of the Constitution or the system of
federalism. 20' As such a right, it was easy for the Court to reach its
decision in Saenz.202 Thus, as Professor Tribe concludes, Saenz may be
more properly seen as "a window to the present and the recent past,"
rather than a "glimpse into the future." 203
V. CONCLUSION
In Saenz the Supreme Court clarified its right to travel juris-
prudence by dividing that right into three components. 204 Furthermore,
the Court grounded the third component of that right in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 205 Thus, Saenz could
signify an attempt by the Court to breathe new life into a clause that was
once thought dead. 206 However, in all likelihood, the impact of Saenz
will be limited to its immediate effect on state welfare systems.207
Bradley A. Meyer
200. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 197.
201. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 198.
202. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 197-98 (stating that the Court is comfortable protecting rights
that can be described in terms of federalism).
203. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 198.
204. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
205. See id. at 502-03.
206. Id at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting)..
207. See 1999 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10, available at 1999 WL 600316. at *2 (stating that sec-
tion 50-09-29(1)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code and section. 75-02-01.2-35.1 of the North
Dakota Administrative Code are likely unconstitutional after the Court's decision in Saenz).
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